

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3919
CIPC A-14

Agenda

MONTHLY MEETING*

31 October 1984, 1530 Hours

25X1

I. OPENING REMARKS/ANNOUNCEMENTS

- Chairman's Notes (Miss Eloise R. Page) (5 Mins.) Chairman
- Status Reports:
 - Ballistic Missile Defenses
 - Chemical/Biological Warfare (CBW) Study
 - Combat Intelligence Analysis Issue
- Status Report on the Terrorism Study (5 Mins.) [Redacted] 25X1
Chairman
- CIPC Collection Strategy Evaluation Concept (5 Mins.) [Redacted] 25X1
VC/CIPC

II. CIPC CBW Intelligence Subcommittee TOR

(10 Mins.)

Chairman

25X1

- Discussion
- Approval

III. CHINA STUDY

(30 Mins.)

Chairman/Members

- Overview
- Discussion
- Committee Recommendations
- Committee Approval

IV. OTHER BUSINESS

(5 Mins.)

Chairman/
Members

25X1

[Redacted]
Executive Secretary

25X1

25X1

*Attendance is limited to Principal Members or designated alternate.

NOTE: If you have questions regarding the agenda or attendance, please
contact the Executive Secretary on [Redacted]

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CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS COMMITTEE MEETING
31 October 1984 - 1530 Hours

25X1

ATTENDEES

CIA	- [redacted] Executive Director	25X1
DIA	- [redacted] (representing [redacted]) Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Affairs	25X1
NSA	- [redacted] Assistant Deputy Director for Operations	25X1
State	- C. Thomas Thorne (representing AMB Francis J. McNeil) Deputy Assistant Secretary for INR	25X1
US Navy	- RADM John L. Butts Director, Naval Intelligence	
US Air Force	- Lt Gen James. C. Pfautz Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	
US Army	- COL James L. Ford Director of Foreign Intelligence, ACSI	
Treasury	- Arthur W. Long Senior National Intelligence Advisor	
FBI	- Thomas E. DuHadway Deputy Assistant Director, Intelligence Division	
US Marine Corps	- John Gunther (representing BGEN Lloyd W. Smith) Director of Intelligence	
Energy	- Charles Boykin Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence	

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

ISSUE: Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) has requested that the DCI task the CIPC to investigate the problem of properly balancing combat intelligence analysis being conducted in the forward area vs. tailored intelligence provided from centralized, resource-efficient processing and analytic centers.

DIRNSA's specific concerns involve issues of imagery and SIGINT analysis, direct down-linking, and a proliferation of tactical processors in the forward area.

Moreover, DIRNSA, while supporting the need for some forward-area direct analysis, is concerned that a non-coherent evolution toward developing an all-source capability to do timely combat intelligence analysis in the field will lead to excessive resource expenditures, in terms of both people and money, which could ultimately impact the Intelligence Community's ability to support national level policymakers and theatre commanders.

DISCUSSION: Although this potential problem is of significant concern to the Program Managers and the intelligence collection managers, and should be studied, it is not readily apparent whether this study should be undertaken by the CIPC or an appropriate DoD organization.

However, given the cross-disciplinary nature of the problem and its potential for impacting on the Intelligence Community ability for ensuring a timely and effective flow of intelligence to all consumers, there is merit for the CIPC Staff to conduct a preliminary investigation of the problem and develop specific recommendations for addressing this issue.

PROCEDURE: A "fast-track" study effort will be undertaken by the CIPC immediately and will be completed within 60 days of implementation.

In order to accomplish this task within the specified timeframe, the C/CIPC shall establish a small task force consisting of senior staff officers from the SIGINT Committee, COMIREX and DIA. The task force will function under the chairmanship of a CIPC Staff Officer. He shall draw upon other ICS and Intelligence Community resources as appropriate to accomplish this task.

APPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

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CIPC Assessment of Collection Strategy

OUTLINE OF CONCEPT

I. Objective:

To establish a cross-disciplinary process for assessing the Intelligence Community's strategy in meeting national intelligence objectives.

II. Approach:

- CIPC develops target-topic summary of needs drawing upon:
 - Intelligence needs/shortfalls from NIOs; DIOs; and INR;
 - Target capability assessment developed by PBS;
 - Community studies as appropriate.
- Collection committees identify cost/benefit of present and potential initiatives to address the needs.
- Ad Hoc Review Panel recommends alternative collection mix options to meet identified shortfalls. (Composition: Chairman; C/CIPC or VC/CIPC; Members, DIA, NRO, CIA, NSA, concerned NIOs, OSD; Observers, C/SIGINT, C/HUMINT, C/COMIREX, D/PBS.
- CIPC endorses summary of shortfalls and recommends alternative collection strategies to NFIC.

III. Major Aspects:

- Incorporates and promotes active participation by Program and Collection Managers.
- Assists decision-making by evaluation of alternative strategies.
- Supplements and supports budget system.
- Focuses on intelligence needs rather than intelligence means.
- Start with prototype, e.g., terrorism or narcotics.
- Flexible, can be expanded or compressed.

25X1

WORKING PAPER

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MISSION AND FUNCTIONS

The Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Intelligence Subcommittee is organized as a working level interagency subcommittee under the auspices of the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC), with representatives from all NFIB agencies.

MISSION:

The mission of the CIPC CBW Intelligence Subcommittee is to assist the CIPC in its support to the DCI on CBW intelligence matters. The primary emphasis of the Subcommittee's efforts will be to assess, assist, and coordinate the Intelligence Community's efforts with regard to foreign CBW developments, and to assist and coordinate the Intelligence Community's efforts in the implementation of the recommendations of the CBW report.

FUNCTIONS:

The Subcommittee will function for a period of 6-12 months. Under the general guidance of the Chairman of the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee, the Subcommittee will review and make recommendations to the CIPC concerning the following areas of special concern:

- -the specific requirements and shortfalls associated with CBW intelligence;
- -current and programmed resources directed against CBW intelligence;
- -options for adjustments which could be accomplished within existing and/or programmed resources;
- -recommendations for new initiatives which could increase Community efforts and resources against CBW intelligence;
- -the composition and functions of the interagency CBW committees.

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AGENDA

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CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS COMMITTEE MEETING
31 October 1984 - 1530 Hours

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
ATTENDEES

CIA	-	[redacted] Executive Director	25X1
* DIA	-	[redacted] (representing [redacted]) Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Affairs	25X1
NSA	-	[redacted] Assistant Deputy Director for Operations	25X1
* State	-	C. Thomas Thorne (representing AMB Francis J. McNeil) Deputy Assistant Secretary for INR	
US Navy	-	RADM John L. Butts <i>Clark Mc.</i> Director, Naval Intelligence	
US Air Force	-	Lt Gen James. C. Pfautz Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	
xx US Army	-	COL James L. Ford Director of Foreign Intelligence, ACSI	
Treasury	-	Arthur W. Long Senior National Intelligence Advisor	
FBI	-	Thomas E. DuHadway Deputy Assistant Director, Intelligence Division	
* US Marine Corps	-	John Gunther (representing BGEN Lloyd W. Smith) Director of Intelligence	
Energy	-	Charles Boykin Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence	

* *Last minute change*xx *Introduced*

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Seating Plan for: 31 October, 1984



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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3919
CIPC A-14

Agenda

MONTHLY MEETING*

31 October 1984, 1530 Hours

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- CIPC Collection Strategy Evaluation Concept (5 Mins.) 25X1

Chairman

VC/CIPC

II. CIPC CBW Intelligence Subcommittee TOR

(10 Mins.)

25X1

- Discussion
- Approval

Chairman
Not coming. However TOR
is straight forward; Carol
can expand if necessary.
(30 Mins.) Chairman/Members

III. CHINA STUDY

- Overview
- Discussion
- Committee Recommendations
- Committee Approval

IV. OTHER BUSINESS

(5 Mins.) Chairman/
Members

25X1

~~Executive Secretary~~

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NOTE: If you have questions regarding the agenda or attendance, please
contact the Executive Secretary on

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3930
19 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

FROM:

[Redacted]

Executive Secretary

25X1

SUBJECT: CIPC Meeting Agenda--31 October 1984 (U)

1. Attached for your information is the agenda for the CIPC Meeting scheduled for 31 October at 1530 hours. (U)

2. Because of conflicting schedules, it was necessary to schedule the meeting at this date and time to ensure maximum attendance. (U)

3. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know. (U)

[Redacted]

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Attachment: As stated

THIS MEMORANDUM MAY BE REGRADED
TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENT.

CL BY Signer
DECL ON OADR

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SUBJECT: CIPC Meeting Agenda--31 October 1984

Distribution: DCI/ICS 84-3930

- 1 - Ea CIPC Member
- 1 - DD/ICS
- 1 - C/COMIREX
- 1 - C/SIGINT
- 1 - C/HUMINT
- 1 - C/FIPC
- 1 - C/IHC
- 1 - D/PPS
- 1 - D/PBS
- 1 - Bob DeBose/State
- 1 - Larry Gershwin, NIO/SP
- 1 - [REDACTED] ANIO/EA
- 1 - Glenn Priddy, Army
- 1 - CIPC/ES
- 1 - CIPC/Subj
- 1 - CIPC/Chrono
- 1 - ICS Registry

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DCI/ICS/CIPC, [REDACTED] (19 Oct 84)

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3919
CIPC A-14

Agenda

MONTHLY MEETING*
31 October 1984, 1530 Hours

25X1

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Chairman

25X1

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VC/CIPC

25X1

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Chairman

25X1

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CHAIRMAN'S NOTES

CIPC MEETING - 31 October 1984
1530 hours

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Chairman's NotesSoviet Ballistic Missile Defenses Study

- The NFIC has approved the study.
- The BMD Study was forwarded to the DCI on 12 October for his approval and promulgation.
- The Perry Panel anticipates that they will complete their study effort in the March/April 1985 timeframe--in time for us to incorporate into our follow-up report to the DCI.

Chemical/Biological Warfare (CBW) Study

- With the exception of CIA, all CIPC members have approved the CBW Study.
- It is imperative that we get coordination on the study in order to send it to the DCI and NFIC. Otherwise, the study will be overtaken by events and its impact lost.
(Eloise: We have already held up the study for over a month awaiting CIA's response.)

Combat Intelligence Analysis Issue

(See Attached)

*Request that Services, Army, Navy, Air Force & Marines,
identify their respective members to ES/CIPC by
COB 2 November.*

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NOFORNThe Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

*Members have copy*COMBAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

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Close: Note that at request of Sen. Williams, representatives from the Service will be added.

APPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

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TERRORISM STUDY

Page Denied

EVALUATION CONCEPT

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*will lead discussion.**Members have copy of outline only.*

CIPC Assessment of Collection Strategy

OUTLINE OF CONCEPT

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CIPC Discussion Paper

CIPC ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTION STRATEGY

The DCI has assigned to the CIPC the "important and critical task" of "evaluating collection strategy mixes in relation to developing national strategy and intelligence needs." The intent of the following concept is to supplement the current Capabilities Program and Budget System so as to permit CIPC, the collection committees, and intelligence customers to make additional input to the evaluation of collection strategy in relation to intelligence needs. The final decisions in the development of such a strategy will remain of necessity with the Program Managers.

Step One:

The CIPC staff draws together a summary on a target or topic describing intelligence needs, the status of Community efforts in satisfying those needs, and the relative order in which unfulfilled needs constitute intelligence shortfalls. Sources for the report would include contributions from the National Intelligence Officers, Defense Intelligence Officers, INR, the PBS target capability assessment, and Community studies as pertinent.

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Step Two:

The resulting summary of intelligence needs on a target topic is passed to the three collection committees. Each collection committee independently reviews the status of efforts and intelligence shortfalls in order to describe (1) the assets, if any, within its purview that now contribute to those areas where shortfalls are most acute, (2) the principal factors--whether resource-related, procedural, or external--that presently serve to limit these contributions at each phase (i.e., collection processing, production, and dissemination) of the intelligence, (3) the anticipated benefit and cost of already programmed improvements, and (4) the potential and cost of further improvements via the introduction of new systems, activities, or procedures within that committee's discipline. Budget estimates and funding profiles of programmed and potential enhancements would be developed in coordination with PBS and program representatives. Options for enhancement would then be ranked by the committee in terms of their cost as well as their impact in closing the intelligence shortfall.

Step Three:

The reports of the three collection committees are received by an ad hoc review panel, a small group of senior Community representatives designated by principal members of the CIPC, augmented by the concerned NIO and

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representatives of the NRO and OSD with the Chairman of the DCI Collection Committees and Director, PBS as observers. Working with the summary of needs and the description of problems and potential enhancements from the collection committees, the first task of the informal review group would be to consolidate potential enhancements against each shortfall. The second task would be to recommend alternative mixes of activities and systems across collection programs and intelligence functions on the basis of both relative benefits and costs. Comprehensive, cross-disciplinary judgments may require additional expertise on specialized topics. If so, special ad hoc working groups could be formed to treat particular issues.

An evaluation of alternative mixes of systems and activities pertinent to the target, with recommendations for that which appears preferable in terms of both cost and effectiveness, would be provided to the CIPC for review. This report would describe the contribution anticipated from each system or activity towards narrowing each intelligence shortfall. It is possible that none of the shortfalls on a particular target topic will be judged sufficiently "critical" to warrant improvement initiatives. Alternatively, critical shortfalls may exist, but no feasible suggestions for improving capabilities may be forthcoming.

The CIPC reviews and endorses the summary of intelligence shortfalls and the system mix recommendations prior to forwarding to NFIC. The opportunity is

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thus presented for earlier and organized consideration of collection alternatives by Program Managers (constituting, if you will, "a sanity check"). The CIPC recommendations plus accompanying justification provide substantive input for the hard choices which ultimately have to be made by the Program Managers. While decisions outside the budget cycle are not precluded, choices would normally be reflected in the ensuing years' Program Guidance.

An informal senior review of this nature would enable the CIPC to make substantive input to the evaluation of collection strategy mixes. Not only would it identify alternatives, but it would address the balance and cost-effectiveness of Community efforts to meet intelligence needs. The concept could be abbreviated or expanded as desired. Step One should present minimal problems since Community coordination of many studies and assessments has been accomplished. Step Two is essentially to evaluate/cost programmed and possible improvements. Step Three is the crux of the process, the identification of various collection mix options ranked in terms of cost effectiveness.

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CBW TOR

CBW TOR

Members have copy

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- -the composition and functions of the interagency CBW committees.

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D C 20505


Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

25X1

DCI/ICS 84-3935
29 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

FROM:


Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: CIPC Meeting Material for 31 October--CBW Subcommittee TOR (U)

1. Attached for your information and review is a copy of the proposed CIPC CBW Intelligence Subcommittee Terms of Reference (TOR). (C)
2. The TOR is a scheduled agenda item for the 31 October CIPC Meeting and will be tabled for discussion and approval. (C)
3. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know. (U)

Attachment: As stated

25X1

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

China Study

Introductory Comments

- The China Study was initiated as a follow up to the 1979 CCPC China Study and was to specifically identify any persistent intelligence gaps.
- The study concludes that progress has been achieved in a number of areas since the 1979 study. Nowhere has ground been lost against topics of major interest.
- However, the more important intelligence gaps of five years ago remain:
 - Shortfalls continue in our knowledge of China's internal political dynamics;
 - the capabilities of, and plans for, its growing nuclear forces forces; and
 - the status of research and development in nuclear weaponry.
- The study contains approximately 35 recommendations for addressing these intelligence shortfalls. However, none of these recommendations have any major resource implications, with the possible exception of some recommended augmentation of analytical resources.
- Member comments.